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COLLEGE DESEGREGATION: TOWARD
ABANDONING THE INTEGRATIVE IDEAL TO
SAVE PUBLICLY FUNDED BLACK
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
I. Introduction
In its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,' the
United States Supreme Court held that the "separate but equal"
doctrine, established and maintained by its prior decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson,2 was inapplicable within the realm of public education.'
Reasoning that purposeful segregation inherently denies equal
educational opportunities to minority students, 4 the Court held that the
operation of dual school systems violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.

A year later, in a continuation of the decision, the

© Copyright 1994 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 11. The case represents the culmination
of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's campaign to eliminate state-imposed segregation
in public education and stands as Justice Thurgood Marshall's most enduring contribution
to the American Civil Rights movement. William M. Treanor, Introductory Remarks
to Brown v. Board of Education and its Legacy."A Tribute to Justice ThurgoodMarshall,
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1992). Brown I endures as the first and most important
expansion of the rights guaranteed to emancipated blacks by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Constance B. Motley, 7e HistoricalSetting of Brown and its Impact on the Supreme
Court's Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 9 (1992).
2 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Court held that the social policy of providing
"equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races" did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law. Id. at 550-51.
3 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
4 Id.
Id. at 495. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

339

340 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI
Court ordered the elimination of de jure segregation 6 by placing
primary responsibility on local school boards to dismantle dual
systems, and to replace them with unitary systems in which
discrimination was eliminated "root and branch." 7 Federal district
courts were instructed to supervise the process under "general
equitable principles" 8 to implement desegregation "with all deliberate
speed." 9 While the Supreme Court has addressed school
desegregation at the primary and secondary levels in numerous
decisions, t" it had never definitively applied Brown H's mandate to
the affirmative steps that a state must take to dismantle dual systems
of education at the college and university level."

' De jure segregation is defined as that which is "directly intended or mandated by
law or otherwise issuing from an official racial classification or in other words . ..
segregation which has or had the sanction of the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425
(6th ed. 1990).
7Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) [hereinafter Brown Ill.
Brown 1 established that segregated educational facilities were inherently unequal, but
did not announce the remedial steps states must take to dismantle their dual systems of
education until the following year in Brown 11. Treanor, supra note 1, at 1. These two
decisions provide two different interpretations of the Constitution. While Brown I only
required that government decisions be made without regard to race, Brown II seemed to
require that children of both races attend the same school. Mark Tushnet, PublicLaw
Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 23 (1992).. By
focusing on the need to integrate under Brown 11, Brown I's message of equal
educational opportunity has been lost. Id. at 24. Brown l's mandate of integration to
create racial balancing will hereinafter be referred to as the "integrative ideal." See Drew
S. Days, III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM.& MARY L. REv.
53 (1992). The Court has used the word "dual" to define a school system that purposely
segregates students by race and "unitary" to describe a school system "which has been
brought in compliance with . . . the Constitution." See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 246 (1991).
8 Brown 11, 349 U.S at 300.
9 Id. at 301. District courts were asked to "consider whether the action of school
authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles" under this process. Id. at 299.
"0See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
"1 Felix V. Baxter, The Affirmative Duty to Desegregate Institutions of Higher
Education-Defining the Role of the Traditionally Black College, 11 J.L. & EDUC. 1,
2 (1992).
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Thirty-eight years later, in United States v. Fordice,t2 the
Supreme Court finally addressed the legacy of segregation in higher
education and defined, for the first time, a state's duty to eliminate
all remaining vestiges of de jure segregation in its institutions of
higher learning in accordance with Brown I and Brown H." With
only Justice Scalia dissenting," the Court held that the State of
Mississippi must take affirmative steps beyond the mere adoption of
race-neutral admission policies to dismantle its former dual systems
of higher education."5 The decision marks a major re-examination of
the judicial framework applied to school desegregation cases and
reaffirms the Court's fundamental commitment to the principles
announced in Brown L 6 Fordice further provides an unexpected
indication that the present Court
is prepared to take an active role to
17
fulfill Brown I's mandate.
This Note will examine the Court's decision in Fordice in
order to place it within the Court's evolving school desegregation
framework, and to analyze its effects on higher education. Part I will
review the background of the dispute by examining the history of
Mississippi's university system, the steps Mississippi had taken to
integrate its eight universities, and, finally, the realities of the de
facto system of segregation which existed within the university system
at the time the suit was filed. Part II will examine the realities of the
de facto system of segregation in the eight universities which existed
at the time Fordice suit was filed. Part II will also examine the
evolution of the judicial framework, which eroded the validity of the
"separate but equal" doctrine in public education and paved the way
for the Court's decision in Brown L Part III will examine the
12 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
13Id. at 2735-38.
14 Id.

at 2746.
,Id. at 2743.
16Ruth Marcus, Court Sees BroadDuty to Erase College Bias: Justices Set Standard
in Mississippi Ruling, WASH. POST, June 27, 1992, at Al.
17Fordice puts all states that had previously operated dual systems of higher
education on notice that they have an affirmative duty to eliminate all vestiges of prior
discrimination traceable to de jure segregation. As of 1992, Alabama, Louisiana,
Maryland, Kentucky, and Texas were involved in suits similar to Fordice. id. Seven
other states have had their university desegregation plans reviewed by the Department
of Education. Id.
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Court's decision in Brown L Part IV will examine the inconsistent
and contradictory judicial framework in which the district courts
applied Brown I's mandate to public institutions of higher learning in
the absence of a clearly defined standard. Part V will examine the
Court's decision in Fordice and the new standard which it announced.
Part VI will discuss the implications of Fordice by addressing serious
questions regarding the future of publicly funded traditional black
schools.

L Background to the Dispute-The Realities of Higher
Education in Mississippi

In 1954, at the time of Brown I, Mississippi maintained dual
school systems at all levels. 8 All eight of Mississippi's state
universities were established before the Supreme Court's landmark

decree.'

9

Thus, under the Court's mandate in Brown 11, the State had

an affirmative duty to dismantle its dual system of education by

eliminating all discriminatory effects that remained as a vestige of its
de jure system of segregation. 20 Despite this mandate, Mississippi
continued its policy of segregation. 1 Integration in any form did not
18 Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 678 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated sub

nom., United States v. Fordice, 112 S.Ct. 2727 (1992).
'9Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2732. The University of Mississippi was established as an
exclusively white school in 1848. Id. In 1871, the State opened Alcom State University
as an agricultural school exclusively for black students. Id. Mississippi State University
was opened in 1880. Id. Mississippi University for Women opened in 1885, and the
University of Southern Mississippi opened in 1912; both exclusively for white students.
Id. In 1940, Jackson State was opened as a black teachers college. Id. Mississippi
Valley State opened in 1950 exclusively for black students wishing to teach at rural black
elementary schools. Id. Mississippi Valley State also provides vocational instruction.
Id.
20Ayers, 914 F.2d at 682. "Mississippi was . . .constitutionally required to
eliminate invidious racial distinctions and dismantle its dual system." Id. Mississippi
did not dispute that it was under such a duty, but maintained that it had fulfilled its
constitutional obligation by maintaining good-faith, nondiscriminatoryadmission policies,
faculty hiring and operations. Fordice, 112 S.Ct. at 2734.
21Ayers, 914 F.2d at 695. James P. Coleman, Governor of Mississippi (1955-60),
commented in 1981 that "[a]s governor, I certainly took the position [that] our schools
and educational institutions would be operated as they always had been." Andrew
Reese, Regional Update, UPI, Aug. 19, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI
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occur until 1962,2 when, pursuant to a court order, James Meridith
23
became the first black admitted to the University of Mississippi.
In 1961, in an effort to forestall integration, Mississippi's
Board of Trustees of Higher Learning (Board of Trustees) instituted
the American College Testing (ACT) requirement for the state's
university system.2 4 All state residents under the age of twenty-one
applying to a state school were required to take the test.25 The score
that an individual received determined an applicant's automatic
acceptance or denial of admission.26 However, only the five
traditionally white schools required a minimum ACT score.27 The28
effects of the tests were obvious as time stood still in Mississippi.
The schools' traditional racial composition remained unchanged as if

file. Governor Coleman promised that there would be no race mixing in Mississippi's
public schools, a promise he kept. Id.
See Ayers, 914 F.2d at 695.
Meridith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828
(1962), enforcedper curiam, 313 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962) (en banc), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 916 (1963). Official opposition to the court order was so great that federal troops
were required to enforce the decision. Constance B. Motley, From Brown to Bakke.: The
Long Road to Equality, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 315, 317 (1979).
24Ayers, 914 F.2d at 680. Mississippi would later argue that its present educational
policies were totally unconnected to its previous segregative policies because admissions
were now based on objective tests, devised by an independent organization, rather than
on race. Maria L. Marcus, Learning Together. Justice Marshall's Desegregation
Opinions, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 102 (1992). Many civil rights advocates believe,
however, that reliance on the ACTs has a substantial discriminatory impact because
black students are placed at a distinct disadvantage when taking standardized tests due
to cultural biases within the tests themselves. Id. In addition, reliance on such tests
excludes consideration of other important factors, such as high school grades. Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Weigh Bias Legacy at Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at
A13.
' Ayers, 914 F.2d at 680.
26 Id. at 680; Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2738-40. In Fordice, the Supreme Court stated
that the test was never intended to be the sole basis for admission, but was intended to
be only one of many criteria considered. Id. at 2740.
2 Ayers, 914 F.2d at 680.
2 See Sonia Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285,
1301 (1979). It was well known that the average black student scored well below the
minimum requirement necessary to attend any of the five traditionally white schools. Id;
see infra text accompanying notes 43-48.
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Brown I was a piece of fiction rather than the supreme law of the
land. 29

In 1969, in an effort to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,30 the United States Department of Health Education and
Welfare (HEW) requested Mississippi to devise and implement a plan
to dismantle the remaining vestiges of its formerly segregated
university system. 3
Four years later, the Board of Trustees
submitted a plan to achieve integration through the implementation of
numerical racial formulas, such as diversification of faculty, remedial
programs for disadvantaged minorities, and special recruitment
programs to attract black students to traditionally white schools.32
HEW requested further changes because it believed that the plan
failed to create a sufficiently diverse university system. 3 The
changes were intended to encourage student choices based on the
educational opportunities offered by a particular institution rather than
on decisons based merely on a school's traditional racial identity.34
In response to HEW's request, the Board of Trustees stated
that Mississippi's university system complied with Title VI and
reluctantly made only minor changes to the plan.35 This plan was
also rejected by HEW. 36 The Board of Trustees decided to
implement the plan despite HEW's rejection, but was prevented from

19 As of the mid-1980s, 99% of white students in the state university system attended
one of the five traditionally white schools while 92% to 99% of the black students in the
system attended the historically black schools. Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court
Allowed the Curefor De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?,78 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 43 (1992). From 1963 to 1975, the five traditionally white schools each
admitted at least one black student a year. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2732. By 1968, only
five white students had attended Alcorn State. Id. Jackson State and Mississippi Valley
State remained completely segregated. Id.; see Greenhouse, supra note 24, at A13.
Alvin 0. Chambliss, Jr., who represented the private citizens who initiated the suit
against the State of Mississippi, stated that "[a] system rooted in the days of apartheid
still exists in Mississippi. Nothing has changed." Id.
1o 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). Title VI denies federal funds to institutions practicing
racial discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988).
"' Fordice, 112 S. Ct at 2732.
32

Id.

33 Id. at 2733.
3 Id.
35Id.
3 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2733.
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doing so by the state legislature's refusal to fund the plan. 3 ' Despite
racially neutral admission standards, each of the eight institutions
continued to retain their historical racial identity. 3"
In 1975, private citizens initiated a lawsuit asserting that
Mississippi perpetuated the effects of its past de jure segregation by
failing to fulfill its affirmative duty to dismantle its dual university
system.39 The United States joined the suit on the plaintiffs' behalf.4"
To avoid litigation, Mississippi entered into negotiations with the
plaintiffs and the Justice Department to devise a plan for voluntary
dismantlement of the state's segregated university system. 41 Despite
these negotiations, the state's actions continued to reinforce the racial
identity of the schools.42
In 1977, the Board of Trustees extended the minimum ACT
requirement for all state institutions by establishing a minimum score
of nine as a prerequisite for admission. 43 Black high school students

" Id. To this day, school funding in Mississippi remains a barrier to further
integration. Black Universities,; Delta Blues, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 30
[hereinafter Delta Blues]. Kirk Fordice, Mississippi's then governor, threatened to "call
out the National Guard to fight any court-ordered tax increases to equalize funding at
Mississippi's nearly all white and all black universities." L. Darnell Weeden, Statutory
and Equal ProtectionRemedies to Save Historically Black Colleges From the Effect of
Invidious Discrimination, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 41, 49 (1992).
Delta Blues, supra note 37, at 30.
s Ayers v. Lynch, No. C.A. 75-9-N (N.D. Miss. 1975). The name of the suit was
subsequently changed to Ayers v. Allain before changing to United States v. Fordice as
the suit wound its way through the appellate process. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2735. The
suit was brought by a former sharecropper, Jack Ayers, Sr., on behalf of his son and 21
other black students. Do Black Colleges Get FairFunding? Court to DecideMississippi
Suit on Alleged Bias, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 22, 1992, at C3. Mr. Ayers died in
1986 at the age of 66. Id. The original plaintiffs asserted that the State of Mississippi
"maintained the racially segregative effects of its prior dual system ... in violation of
the Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d." Fordice, 112 S. Ct.
at 2733.
40 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2733.
41 Id.
42 See generally Ayers, 914 F.2d at 679-80 (finding that the law clearly imposed
upon Mississippi an affirmative duty to dismantle its racially dual system of education,
but the scope of the duty was not as broad in the context of higher education as it was
for primary and secondary education).
4' Id. at 682.
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were more liberally exempted from taking core courses considered
necessary for success in the ACT. 44 Predictably, the scores received
by black students remained consistently below those received by
white students. 45 The minimum ACT score required for admission to
the five traditionally white schools was set at fifteen, well above the
test scores received by the average black student, and far exceeding
the minimum score of nine required for admission to the traditionally
black schools.4 6 While exceptions for students not obtaining the
minimum required score remained in place for each school, the
number of exceptions for the five white schools were considerably
limited in comparison to the number exempted for the three black
Through these policies, the Board of Trustees
schools.4 7
systematically barred the average black student from attending the
five traditionally white schools, almost as effectively as they had done
under their de jure system segregation prior to 1954.48
These discriminatory policies were reinforced in 1981 when
the Board of Trustees devised a designation system which assigned
one of three "missions" to all eight schools. 49 The mission
designations include: "Comprehensive" institutions, which provide the
most opportunities to students by a offering a wide variety of degree
programs;"0 "urban" institutions, which primarily serve the
communities in which they are located; 5 ' and "regional" institutions,
which only provide undergraduate programs. 2 The funding that an
institution receives depends entirely on its mission designation.53
Although two of the white schools were designated comprehensive
institutions, none of the traditionally black universities were
designated as such, effectively denying the average black student in

"Id.
4' Id.
46 Id.

at 680.

4 Ayers, 914 F.2d at 679-80.
48 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2733-34.
49Ayers, 914 F.2d at 681.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52

Id.

53 7.
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Mississippi the opportunity to attend a comprehensive university.'
The three remaining white schools mirrored the designations of the
three black schools, two were regional and one was urban.55
By the mid-1980s, the cumulative effect of these policies was
clear. As of 1986, the state spent an average of $8,516 for each
student attending one of the five traditionally white schools, while
spending only $6,038 on each student attending one of the three
traditionally black schools.56 In reality, Mississippi's traditionally
black schools "'were never intended to be replicas of the white
colleges, and the funding they got reflected it. ''57 Despite
race-neutral admission standards, ninety-nine percent of the state's
white students were enrolled in the five traditionally white schools.58
The student bodies at these schools still remained from eighty to

-"Ayers, 914 F.2d at 681. The minimum ACT score required to attend any of the
five traditionally white schools (15) places admission beyond the reach of the average
black student. Id. at 679-80. Consequently, the average black high school student has
little chance of attending a comprehensive university.
See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
sAyers, 914 F.2d at 682.
Judi Hasson, The Future on the Line. Black Colleges Watch DesegregationCase,
USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 1991, at A3. This disparity in funding is significant. For
example, the library at the traditionally white University of Southern Mississippi
contained 836,600 volumes, while the libraries of the three traditionally black schools
combined contained only 629,000. Id. The disparity in funding is further illustrated by
comparing the predominately black Mississippi Valley State College to the
overwhelmingly white Delta State University situated less than 50 miles from one
another. Aaron Epstein, Segregation Ruling Slaps Mississippi Universities, HOUS.
CHRON., June 27, 1992, at Al. Delta State offers its faculty higher salaries than
Mississippi Valley State College, which has the lowest faculty salaries of any state
institution. Id. Delta State University also offers four times as many degree programs,
and has twice as many volumes in its library. Id. The effects of the disparity in funding
are not limited to educational opportunities provided to students. As of 1986, less than
5% of the faculty at the three historically white institutions were black while black
faculty members accounted for over 66% of the faculty at the traditionally black schools.
See Brown, supra note 29, at 43 n.182. When combined with the funding disparity, this
racial imbalance effectively means that, on average, black faculty members may receive
lower salaries than their white counterparts. See generally id. at 81 (raising the issue
of funding inequalities between black and white schools).
" Hasson, supra note 56, at A3 (quoting David Sansing, professor of history at the
University of Mississippi).
-"Fordice, 112 S.Ct. at 2734.
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ninety-one percent white.59 Seventy-one percent of all black students
attended the three historically black schools, whose racial
compositions ranged from ninety-two to ninety-nine percent black.6"
By 1987, it was evident that further negotiations were
pointless.61 The case proceeded to trial where Mississippi asserted
that it had fulfilled its obligation to dismantle its de jure segregated
university system by adopting racially neutral admission standards,
despite the overwhelming evidence that its segregative policies were,
in fact, still in place.62 The matter would eventually be decided by
the Supreme Court because of a complete absence of an exacting
judicial standard to decide whether a state has fulfilled its duty to
dismantle its de jure system of segregation at the university level. 63
The fact that the plaintiffs would have to resort to the Supreme Court
to end the confusion and contradictions which persisted for thirtyeight years in the lower courts after Brown I stands as an indictment
of the American judicial system itself, and is a testament to its failure
to provide relief to the victims of past discrimination.64

II. Undermining Plessy-The Road to Brown
Brown I was the first Supreme Court case to focus on
segregation in education at the primary and secondary levels.65 All
previous school desegregation cases directly addressed a state's duty
to provide equal educational opportunities to minorities at the college
and university level within the context of the "separate but equal"

'9 Id. at 2734. This is despite the fact that Mississippi has the largest percentage of
black citizens of any state in the union (36%). Delta Blues, supra note 37, at 58. Out
of 58,000 students enrolled at state schools in Mississippi, only 17,000 are black.
William Raspberry, Pyrrhic Victory, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1993, at A23. Only 4,000
of the 17,000 attend the three traditional white schools. Id.
6 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2734.
61Id.
62 Id.

61 Id. at 2735.

6Id. at 2734.
6 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 487; see David Chang, The Bus Stops Here, 63 B.U. L.
REv. 1, 6 (1983).
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doctrine. 6 These earlier decisions initiated the erosion of the
"separate but equal" doctrine, thus laying the foundation upon which
the Brown I Court could declare segregation in education inherently
unequal. 67
The first major case recognizing a constitutional right under
the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to higher education was
Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada.68 In Gaines, the plaintiff was
denied admission to the School of Law of the State University of
Missouri because of a state policy compelling the segregation of its
universities.69 Although the State did not provide a separate facility
for the legal education of black students, it advised the plaintiff that
assistance was available if he wished to attend law school in a

IBaxter, supra note 11, at 3. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund intentionally
adopted the strategy of attacking segregation at the college and university level because
these cases could be adjudicated within the "separate but equal" context because separate
schools for blacks were rarely provided. Motley, supra note 1, at 10-11. Thus, the
constitutional validity of segregated education could be undermined without prematurely
putting the issue of whether separate could ever be equal before the Court. Id.
Thurgood Marshall and his associates believed that the southern states would be forced
to admit blacks into their graduate schools because providing separate facilities would
be too expensive. Id. Eventually the validity of segregation per se at all levels could
be brought before the Court. Id. The strategy's first major victory ironically forced the
integration of the University of Maryland Law School, which had once denied Marshall
admission because of his race. Dona L. Irvin, A True Believer on the Supreme Court,
SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 24, 1992, at 9. Marshall called the victory "sweet revenge."
Id.
67Baxter, supra note 11, at 3. Justice Clark indicated in a memorandum to his
colleagues that he understood the consequences of the Court's decisions in higher
education. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 23. "'How will I vote when the ... grammar
school cases arise? I do not know .... .- Mark Tushnet, with Katya Lezin, What
Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1867, 1891
(1991) (quoting Memorandum (Apr. 1950) (Tom C. Clark papers, Tarlton Law Library,
Univ. of Texas Law School, Box A2, folder 3)). "'[But, if] some say this undermines
Plessy then let it fall as have many Nineteenth Century oracles."' Dennis J. Hutchinson,
Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision Making in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68
GEo. L.J. 1, 90 (1979) (quoting Memorandum on Sweatt and McLaurin from Mr. Justice
Clark to the Conference (Apr. 7, 1950) (File 4029, Box 218)).
"
"305 U.S. 337 (1938).
6Id. at 342-43.
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neighboring state." The Court held that the educational opportunity
provided to the black plaintiff was not equal to the opportunities
provided to white students because he was denied the opportunity to
attend law school within the State of Missouri.71 Thus, in Gaines,
the Court established that equal protection under the "separate but
equal" doctrine required States to provide equal educational
opportunities to minorities, instead of merely requiring the equality
of the education actually provided.72 This is a subtle, yet crucial,
distinction which would form the underlying reasoning for the
Court's decision in Brown I sixteen years later.73
In Sipuel v. Board of Regents,74 a qualified black applicant
70

Id. The Court quoted § 9622 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (1929) which,

in relevant part, provides:
Pending the full development of the Lincoln University, the board of
curators shall have the authority to arrange for the attendance of
negro residents of the state of Missouri at the university of any
adjacent state to take any course or to study any subjects provided
for at the State University of Missouri, and which are taught at the
Lincoln University and to pay the reasonable tuition fees for such
attendance; provided that whenever the board of curators deem it
advisable they shall have the power to open any necessary school or
department.
Id.
7 Id. at 342. The ruling was of limited practical value, however, because the Court
declined to order Missouri to admit the plaintiff into the all-white law school. The Court
merely invalidated the out-of-state scholarship program because it did not provide Mr.
Gaines with an equal opportunity to attend law school in Missouri. Id. Missouri opted
to provide non-whites the opportunity to attend law school in the state by building
separate facilities at Lincoln University. Id. Mr. Gaines never applied for admission
to the all black school. Motley, supra note 1, at 11. The allegedly equivalent black
law school was housed in a building in St. Louis, which also housed a hotel and a movie
theater. REMOVING THE BADGE OF SLAVERY: THE RECORD OF BROWN V. BoARD oF
EDUCATION xxii-xxiii (Mark Whitman ed. 1993) [hereinafter REMOVING THE BADGE].
7' See generally 305 U.S. at 350 (finding it "impossible to conclude that what
otherwise would be an unconstitutional discrimination, with respect to the legal right to
the enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be justified by requiring resort to
opportunities elsewhere").
' See generally Baxter, supra note 11, at 3-4 (stating that prior to Brown I, federal
courts rendered several decisions that laid the foundation for the "express repudiation of
the doctrine in the context of elementary and secondary educational systems").
74 332 U.S. 631 (1948). Sipuel marks the first time that the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund relied on experts to demonstrate the psychological harms caused by -racial
segregation in education. Robert Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later:
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was denied admission to the School of Law of the University of
Oklahoma, the only state supported law school within the state, solely
on the basis of her race." While the State could have complied with
the "separate but equal" doctrine by establishing a separate institution
for black students, it had not done so, and, thus, denied black
students the immediate opportunity to study law within the state as
was provided for white students.76 The Court held that until the
State provided blacks the opportunity to attend law school "as soon
as it does for applicants of any other group," the denial of black
applicants to the all white school was inherently unequal and, thus,
unconstitutional.77 In reaching its decision, the Court had once again
focused on the equality of opportunity actually provided to black
students.78

In Sweatt v. Painter,79 the Court for the first time considered
the implications of the Fourteenth Amendment as it applied to a
state's ability to segregate graduate students on the basis of race
where separate facilities had been established."0 In Sweatt, a black
applicant was denied admission to the University of Texas Law
School solely because of the color of his skin."1 In reaching its
decision, the Court looked beyond quantifiable factors such as the
equality of the schools' facilities in order to concentrate on external
factors, which directly effect educational opportunities:

Looking Backward Into the Future, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615, 616 (1979). The
strategy would be refined and adapted until it yielded ultimate victory in Brown I six
years later. Id.
332 U.S. at 633.
76 Id. at 632-33.
77id.
7 Id.
339 U.S. 629 (1950). The State opened and maintained the School of Law of the
Texas State University for Negroes, which provided an in-state opportunity for the
plaintiff to attend law school. Id. at 631. At the time of trial, the school was housed
in the basement of an Austin office building. Id. The school had 4 instructors for 10
students, and a library containing 16,500 volumes as compared to the 65,000 volumes
found in the white school's library. Id. at 632-33. In Sweatt, the Court found that the
students attending the all-black school were provided with essentially equal facilities
because they were allowed.to use the State's white law school's library. Id.
0 Id. at 635.
s Id. at 631.
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[T]he University of Texas Law School possesses to a
far greater degree those qualities which are incapable
of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but
a few, include reputation of faculty, experience of the
administration, position and influence of the alumni,
standing in the community, traditions and prestige.82
Relying on these findings, the Court held that the black school did
not provide equal educational opportunities, as demanded by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered that the plaintiff be admitted to
the University of Texas Law School.83 This holding seriously
questioned the validity of the philosophical underpinnings of the
"separate but equal" doctrine by tacitly acknowledging that separate
was rarely ever equal."
Later in the same year that Sweatt was decided, the Supreme
Court, in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Education,85 similarly held that the University of Oklahoma could not
restrict a black graduate student from using certain school facilities
solely because of his race.86 While the tangible aspects of the
plaintiff's education, such as access to faculty and libraries were
equal, 87 the Court relied on less tangible factors, such as the
plaintiff's unequal opportunity to engage in a free and open exchange
with other students. 88 The Court considered such opportunities
fundamental to an education, and concluded that "the conditions

2 Id.
83

at 634.

Id.

" See generally Baxter, supra note 11, at 5-6 (arguing that the Supreme Court, by
assessing qualities of an education unable to be quantified, began to erode the "separate
but equal" doctrine).
85 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
Id. at 642. The plaintiff, George McLaurin, was a 68 year old student seeking
a doctoral degree in education. REMOVING THE BADGE, supra note 71, at xxix-xxx.
" McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640-41. In reality, facilities provided to black students
admitted to all white schools were rarely equal. For example, Mr. McLaurin was forced
to sit in an anteroom immediately outside his classrooms, required to use a library carrel
behind a stack of newspapers, and was allowed to use the university cafeteria only after
the white students had eaten. Id. at 640.
'Id. at 641.
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under which this appellant is required to receive his education
deprive[d] him of his personal and present right to the equal
protection of the laws.""
By recognizing the importance of intangible and esoteric
measures in the equality of education in Sweatt, and that the
separation of the races diminishes the educational opportunities of
blacks in McLaurin, the Court, without explicitly rejecting the
"separate but equal" doctrine, implicitly suggested that separate
educational facilities could never be equal.9" Thus, these decisions
seriously eroded the legal and moral validity of the "separate but
equal" doctrine in public education, and served as major precursors
to the Court's decision in Brown L91 The Supreme Court would not
address a major question concerning segregation in higher education
92
again until Fordice forty-two years later.
III. The Decision and Legacy of Brown
While having the unintended effect of eroding the "separate
but equal" doctrine, the cases leading up to Brown I focused on
obtaining equal facilities for blacks at the university level. 93 In
Brown I, the Court shifted its focus to the primary and secondary

IId. at 642.
o See generally Baxter, supra note 11, at 6 (stating that the Court's decisions hinged
on other factors, such as the lack of opportunity to exchange ideas with other students).
In reviewing the decisions, the editors of the Alabama Law Review concluded that even
without directly confronting its prior decision in Plessy, "the attitude of the Court must
be interpreted definitely to be that segregation is unconstitutional per se." REMOVING
THE BADGE, supra note 71, at xxx (quoting Note, ALA. L. REv 181, 182 (1950)). The
New Republic similarly commented that segregation "as a way of life is clearly doomed."
Id. (quoting THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 19, 1950, at 4).
9' Motley, supra note 1, at 9-10.
92 Linda Greenhouse, Slim Margin; Moderates on Court Defy Predictions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 1.
9 Baxter, supra note 11, at 2.
94 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka was the formal name given to four
separate cases coming from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware which were
consolidated for argument in the Supreme Court. 347 U.S. at 486. Brown I itself came
out of Topeka, Kansas. Id. at 486 n. 1. The State of Kansas permitted segregation, but
did not require it. Id. Delaware, Virginia, and South Carolina constitutionally mandated
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levels, and addressed the impact of segregation itself by asking
whether separate educational facilities could ever be equal. 9 For the
first time, segregation in education itself was on trial. 96 Writing for
a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren stated:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its
full development and its present place in American
life throughout the Nation .

. .

. Today education is

perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments ....

Today it is a principal instrument

in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment. .

.

. Such an

opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms. 97

The Chief Justice deftly freed the Court from considerations of the
historical intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the
constraints of the framework adopted in Plessy, to open the door for
a new interpretation of equal protection based on, equality of
opportunity under the law."9

segregation in public schools.

PERRY A. ZIRKEL & SHARON N. RICHARDSON, A DIGEST

OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING EDUCATION 88 (1988).

Topeka was
Kansas's only city with a sizeable black population in a generally rural state with little
mandated segregation. Motley, supra note 1, at 13. Kansas entered the Union as a free
state. Id.
" 347 U.S. at 486. Ironically, Linda Brown would renew her claim in 1979,
asserting that the Topeka school system had yet to satisfy Brown IH's requirements. See
Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 855 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated, Board of Educ.
v. Brow,, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992).
96 See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 492.
97 Id. at 492-93 (emphasis added).
" Id. See generally Motley, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing Chief Justice Warren's
foward-looking opinion and his disregard for the holding in Plessy). Amazingly, Chief
Justice Warren's opinion never addressed Plessy's significance. See Brown 1, 347 U.S.
at 492-93.
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Applying this new standard, the Court held that separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal based on findings that
minority children were psychologically damaged by de jure
segregation, 99 and, thus, denied equal benefit of educational
opportunity in segregated schools:
To separate . . . [minority children] from others of

similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone ...

in the

field of public education the doctrine of "separate but
equal" has no place.' 00
While the Court's decision in Brown I was confined to the
realm of public education, Chief Justice Warren's opinion marked the
beginning of the end of de jure segregation in the United States, 0 1

9 Id. at 495. The theory adopted by the Court was based on Dr. Kenneth Clark's
research which suggested that segregation adversely affected black children's ability to
learn because of the badge of inferiority it conferred on them. Motley, supra note 1,
at 13. This was a new theory developed specifically to attack the validity of segregation
in education. Id. It was inspired by Mendez v. Westminister Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp.
544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947), in which the court held that
the segregation of Mexican-American children was unconstitutional because of the
perception within the community that the Mexican-American school was inferior to the
white school. See Motley, supra note 1, at 13.
100Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494. The decision is universally "regarded as the most
revolutionary race relations decision in the Court's history." Motley, supra note 23, at
316.
'1' See Motley, supra note 1, at 16; see also Ronald Smothers, Cursed and Praised,
Retiring Judge Recalls Storm, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1991, at B3 (illustrating how the
principle announced in Brown 1 was extended by district courts to end segregation in
parks, restaurants, bus stations, libraries, and museums); Morton J. Horwitz, The
Jurisprudenceof Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
599, 609 (1979) (explaining how the decision in Brown served as a catalyst for social
change). The sweeping implications of the decision are perhaps best illustrated by the
NAACP's lawyers' predictions that their decades-long struggle for equal rights was at
the beginning of its end. Symposium, Race and the American City: The Kerner
Commission in Retrospect-An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1297-98 (1993).
On the day after the May 17, 1954 decision, Thurgood Marshall predicted that by the
100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation (1963), segregation in all forms
would no longer exist in the United States. Derrick Bell, Law, Litigation, and the
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by powerfully suggesting that the separation of races predicated on
the superiority of whites over blacks could not be tolerated under
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 02 Brown I, thus, serves as
the symbolic rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine.1" 3 It is
important to note, however, that Brown I never explicitly repudiated
the "separate but equal" doctrine." 4 Had it chosen to, the Court
could have accepted Justice Harlan's invitation to declare that "our
constitution is color-blind. "1 05 Had the Court done so, Brown I
would have expanded the meaning of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment to initiate the immediate dismantling of all

Searchfor the Promised Land, 76 GEO. L.J. 229 (1987) (reviewing MARK V. TUSHNET,
LEGAL STRATEGIES AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION (1987)).

Similarly, Judge

William Hastie, the first black to sit on the federal bench, counseled a black law student
that "the Supreme Court struck down racial segregation laws three years ago, and except
for some mopping up, you will find little work to do in the civil rights field." Id. at 229.
Beyond its pronounced influence over race relations in the United States, the decision
also rekindled the ongoing debate over the Court's proper role and function under
judicial review. Horwitz, supra note 101, at 603.
'o See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
103id. at 493. Accepting the idea that segregation itself bestows a sense of
inferiority on those minorities separated from the mainstream stands as an implicit
rejection of the legal underpinnings on which the separate but equal doctrine rested:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
'4See Chang, supra note 65, at 5 (arguing that "Brown did not discard the 'separate
but equal' doctrine, but reinterpreted its applicability in the realm of public education").
Plessy was finally overturned in Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), which
affirmed a district court's decision to ban segregation on local buses in Montgomery,
Alabama, without hearing the case or writing an opinion. Motley, supra note 1, at 15.
105Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan stated that
segregation "proceeded on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded
that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens." Id. He
believed that excluding blacks from coaches set aside for whites illustrated the white
race's sense of superiority and dominance in American society. Id. "Our Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens . .

.

. In my

opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as
the decision made. . . in the Dred Scott case." Id.
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forms of purposeful governmental segregation."0 6 Instead, the Court
took an intermediate step by creating a new analytical framework
which expanded the "separate but equal" doctrine to require equal
educational opportunities rather than merely requiring tangibly equal
facilities. 107
In Brown I, the Court declared that tangible facilities were not
the only thing that contributed to a child's education, and held that
educational benefits provided by public schools must in all respects
be the same for black children as they are for white children.108 The
Brown I Court found that stigmatizing harms created by segregation
caused black children to receive far less educational benefit than
white children." 9 Brown I thus clearly states that purposeful
governmental segregation in education is unconstitutional because the
sense of inferiority it creates in the minds of black children deprives
them of equal educational opportunities.110 Historically, the decision
106 See

generally id. at 560 (arguing that state enactments treat one race as inferior

which renders permanent peace impossible).
107 See Chang, supra note 65, at 5.
In fact, the existence of equal educational
facilities was a myth. The schools provided for blacks during the Plessy era were
underfunded and undervalued. Brown, supra note 29, at 15. White schools had better
paid teachers, longer terms, and better physical facilities. Id. For example, in 1929,
Mississippi provided nine times the resources for white schools as it did for black
schools. Id.
10 347 U.S. at 493.
'09 Id. at 494.
o Id. at 494-95; see Chang, supra note 65, at 9-10. Perhaps no one described the
process by which segregation humiliates and degrades its victims better than Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., who stated that:
[W]hen you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech
stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-old daughter why
she can't go to the public amusement park that has just been
advertised on television, and see tears welling up in her eyes when
she is told that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see the
ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in her little mental
sky, and see her beginning to distort her personality by developing
bitterness toward white people; ... when your first name becomes
"nigger" and your middle name becomes "boy" . . . your wife and
mother are never given the respected title "Mrs."; when you are
harried by day and haunted by night by the fact that you are a
Negro, .... when you are forever fighting a degenerating sense of
"nobodiness"-then you will understand why we find it difficult to
wait .... Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law
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has been read as demanding racial integration in all publicly funded
schools, in light of Brown 11's mandate for affirmative remedial steps
to integrate formerly segregated schools.'11 Ignored in this
construction, however, is the central mandate underlying the Court's
decison in Brown I, which requires States to provide equal
educational opportunity to all students regardless of race." 2 By
focusing on the implementation of Brown 11's mandate to integrate,
in almost all subsequent decisions, Brown I's true mandate of equality
of educational benefits for all children has all but been forgotten.'"
Brown 11 created a constitutionally unique and powerful

remedial tool that has enabled district courts to dismantle dual school
systems." 4 Of particular importance is the Supreme Court's decision
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,"5 which
provided general guidance to the district courts with respect to their
remedial powers under Brown II."6 In Swann, the Court clearly

announced that beyond being merely empowered to eliminate existing
legal barriers to integrated schools, district courts were to implement
and oversee plans to eliminate the continuing effects of past
segregation where local school boards have failed to do so." 7 "The
that degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes
are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the
personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and
the segregated a false sense of inferiority.
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from a Birmingham City Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T
WArr 81-82 (1963).
..349 U.S. at 294; see Chang, supra note 65, at 9-10.
"2 See 347 U.S. at 495; see also supra text accompanying notes 101-07 (declaring
that equal tangible facilities have to be coupled with equal educational benefits).
"' Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Black Colleges and the DesegregationDilemma, 28 EMORY
L.J. 949 (1979); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
n Chang, supra note 65, at 8.
1 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
116 Id. at 6.
117Id. at 20-21. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system operated 107 schools
attended by more than 84,000 students. Id. at 6. As of June 1969, approximately twothirds of Charlotte's 21,000 black students attended 21 schools which were 99% black.
Id. at 7. The Court held that the school board's policies created the segregation and
approved the district court's order of a busing plan to integrate the schools. Id. at 30.
The average bus trip was seven miles, and lasted no longer than 35 minutes. Id. The
Court warned local authorities that the courts could mandate remedies that were
"administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre, in some situations" to

1994]

COLLEGE DESEGREGATION

359

objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all
vestiges of state-imposed segregation.""' 8 The remedial power to
redress current detriments caused by a previously motivated racist act
is unique to the context of education, 19 and sends a clear message
that schools which are currently segregated because of a past
governmental policy are required to take affirmative steps to
desegregate. 120 Swann reaffirmed the significance the Court attaches
to the central role public education plays in our society.'' This
mandate to eliminate all vestiges of prior segregation is essential to
the Court's decision in Fordice.
IV. Implementing Brown: Confusion in the Lower Courts
In Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control,' the
Supreme Court immediately extended the principles announced in
Brown I to insitutions of higher education. 2 1
No such
pronouncement was ever made relating to Brown H.124 While the
Supreme Court gave considerable attention to the affirmative efforts
taken to desegregate primary and secondary schools at the local level,
it ignored the issue at the university and college level.125 The lower
courts were left to adapt and develop the Court's pronouncements
into a judicial framework, which would define a state's duty to
eliminate vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Id. at 28. In defending these
extraordinary measures, Chief Justice Burger stated that "all things being equal, with no
history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest
their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately
constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation." Id.
n Id. at 15.
19 Chang, supra note 65, at 14.
120Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16. See generally Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300-01
(demanding that schools desegregate, taking whatever steps necessary, including revising
local laws).
121402 U.S. at 20-21. See generally Chang, supranote 65, at 15-16 (suggesting that
educational rights must be placed in a different constitutional context because of its
paramount importance in today's society).
122347 U.S. 971 (1954).
"23
Id. (remanding the case "for consideration in the light of Brown [1]").
124See Baxter, supra note 11, at 7.
125Id.
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dismantle dual systems of higher education.126 As could be predicted,
127
confusion, disorder, and contradiction were the order of the day.
The earliest significant case to reach the lower courts was Lee
v. Macon County Board of Education,121 in which the plaintiff argued
that the State of Alabama operated a dual system of higher education
in direct violation of the principles announced in Brown 1.129 The
district court found ample evidence that the state operated its
institutions "as if Brown v. Board of Education were inapplicable in
these areas. ""0 The court ordered the implementation of system-wide
desegregation, but limited the State's remedial duty to a guarantee of
freedom of choice."' One year later in Green v. County School
Board,1 2 the Supreme Court rejected this approach for primary and

"6 Id. at 7-18.

127
Id.
1s 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala 1967).
19 Id. at 461, 464.
"I Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
131Id. at 479. The court held that:
No person shall be denied admission to any trade school, junior
college, or state college administered by the Alabama State Board of
Education upon the ground of race, nor shall he be subjected to
racial discrimination in connection with his application for
enrollment in or his attendance at such trade school, junior college,
or state college. Dual attendance zones based on race for such trade
school, junior colleges and state colleges shall be abolished.
Id. at 484. The court also ordered the Alabama Department of Education to take
affirmative steps to recruit, hire, and assign teachers to achieve desegregated faculties
at these schools by September, 1967. Id.
13 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
New Kent was a county in rural Virginia with no
residential segregation, and one white school and one black school. Id. at 432. Twentyone buses were required to transport the students to their racially assigned school. Id.
The suit brought on behalf of the black students forced the school board to adopt a
freedom of choice plan which allowed the individual students to choose between the two
schools. Id. at 433. The plan read in part: "[E]very student, regardless of race may
'freely' choose the school he will attend." Id. at 437. Students who did not choose
were assigned to the school they last attended. Id. at 434. The Court rejected the plan
because it did not result in substantial desegregation. Id. at 441. After three years, the
traditionally black school remained all-black, while only 15 % of all black students chose
to attend the white school. Id. The Court determined that, despite the plan, "the school
system remain[ed] a dual system," and ordered the school board to "come forward with
a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id.
at 439, 441.
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secondary education by holding that the mere adoption of freedom of
choice plans 133 did not discharge a state's affirmative duty to
dismantle dual school systems.1 34 Green's holding would not be
explicitly extended to institutions of higher learning until the Court's
decision in Fordice twenty-four years later.. 35
The next major case examining a state's duty to desegregate
its institutions of higher learning was Alabama State Teachers
Association v. Alabama Public Schools and College Authority
(ASTA).1 36 In this case, the Alabama State Teachers Association
challenged the State's plans to construct a branch of Auburn
University in close proximity to the formerly all-black Alabama State
Teachers College.1 37 The district court held that the State had an

"IIn Green, the school board contended that their good faith efforts to allow
students to freely choose the school they would attend satisfied Brown Ii's mandate to
dismantle their dual systems. Id. at 437. The school board asserted that any lingering
segregation resulted from free choice, and not from a government mandated policy. Id.
The Court rejected this argument specifically because the plan in question did not result
in any appreciable desegregation. Id. Other southern school districts attempted to
dismantle their dual school systems by adopting plans in which students simply chose the
school they wished to attend. See Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326 (4th Cir.
1967); Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1968). Mississippi would use the same
argument in asserting that it had met its duty to dismantle its state university system.
See infra text accompanying notes 195-204. It is important to note that freedom of
choice plans per se do not violate Brown I's mandate to dismantle dual school systems.
Green, 391 U.S. at 439-40. Had the plan resulted in measurable racial balancing, the
district's duty to dismantle its dual system would have been met. Id. at 440-41. The
fallacy behind freedom of choice plans is that in the face of intimidation, resentment, and
scorn, blacks never really had a free or uncoerced choice to attend the traditionally allwhite schools just as whites would never consider entering traditionally black schools.
See Diane Ravitch, Desegregation, Varieties of Meaning, in SHADES OF BROwN: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 38 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
114391 U.S. at 437-38.
13 See Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736. In his opinion, which concurred and dissented
in part, Justice Scalia stated that "the Court is essentially applying to universities the
amorphous standard adopted for primary and secondary schools in Green." Id. at 274849.
" 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
'37 Id. at 786-87. The plaintiffs asserted that building a branch of Auburn University
in such close proximity to Alabama State Teachers College violated Alabama's
affirmative duty to desegregate because it did not maximize desegregation efforts. Id.
They also argued that the new college was built to provide a school for white students
in the area, thereby promoting segregation. Id. at 787-88.
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affirmative duty to dismantle its dual system,' 38 but defined this duty
by merely, requiring the State to adopt race-neutral admission policies
(essentially a freedom of choice plan) and to integrate faculty at state
schools to the fullest extent possible. 139 The court revealed its
contempt towards court ordered desegregation by noting the
differences between the compulsory nature of primary education and
the voluntary nature of higher education, and warned against judicial
intervention in a state's higher education policy decisions. 4 ' These
arguments would re-emerge as the basis of Mississippi's position in
Fordice.4 '
In Sanders v. Ellington, 42 a Tennessee district court provided
a remarkably different remedy. The plaintiffs in Sanders, with the
support of the United States Justice Department, challenged the
University of Tennessee's plan to build a new facility in Nashville,
arguing that it would impede efforts to desegregate the traditionally
black Tennessee Agricutural & Industrial University.1 43 The court
denied the plaintiffs' request to halt construction of the new facility
because it found no evidence that the facility was intended to provide
programs comparable to Tennessee Agricultural & Industrial
University. 44 However, the court made broad-based findings that,
despite the adoption of race-neutral admission policies, Tennessee had
made very little progress in desegregating its traditionally black
universities. 145 The court ordered the State to take further affirmative
steps to desegregate Tennessee's university system . 46 Three years

...
Id. at 787.
"' Id. at 789. The restrictive and limited reading of a state's duty to dismantle
traditionally segregated colleges and universities will hereinafter be referred to as the
ASTA doctrine.
' Id. at 787-88.
141 See Fordice,112 S. Ct. at 2734.
142 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
143 Id. at 939. The plaintiffs asked the court to compel the State to "present a plan
calculated to produce meaningful desegregation of the public universities of Tennessee."
Id.
'4 Id. at 941.
145 Id.
'4 Id. at 943. The court in Sanders observed that:
mhe failure to make A & I a viable, desegregated institution . . .
in the near future is going to lead to its continued deterioration as an

1994]

COLLEGE DESEGREGATION

363

later, in Norris v. State Council of Higher Education,147 a Virginia
district court announced an even broader formulation of a state's duty
to eliminate the vestiges of segregation at the university level.1 48 In
Norris, the plaintiffs challenged a proposal to turn the predominately
white Richard Bland College from a two-year institution into a fouryear college. 1 49 The State asserted that it had satisfied its
requirements under the ASTA doctrine by adopting race-neutral
admission standards and implementing faculty integration. 50 The
court rejected the State's argument, stating that the holding in ASTA
applied only to the particular facts of that case and should not be
construed as creating a universal approach. 5 '
The Norris court defined a state's duty as taking the same
"steps . . . necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated 'root and branch"' at the
university level as would be required at the primary level.' 52
However, the court rejected the plaintiffs' request that the two
schools be merged, based on concerns raised in the dissent with
respect to the detrimental effects such a merger may impose on black
students. 53 Instead, the court prevented the State from implementing
its plans to expand the college.' 54 Just as the court had rejected the
ASTA doctrine as applying to all situations, the court carefully warned

institution of higher learning . . . . [lt is clearly apparent on the
record that something must be done for that school and that the one
thing that is absolutely essential is a substantial desegregation of that
institution by whatever means can be devised by the best minds that
the State of Tennessee can bring to it.
Id. Ironically, the court observed that regarding the integration of the historically white
schools "it appears genuine progress is being made." Id. at 942.
14' 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1971).
'4 Id. at 1372-73.
149 Id. at 1369.
The plaintiffs claimed that the move would be destructive to the
predominately black Virginia State College's efforts to attract white students. Id. at
1370-71.
so Id. at 1372.
15 Id.
152327 F. Supp. at 1373 (quoting Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437
(1968)). This standard for a state's duty to dismantle formerly segregated colleges and
universities will hereinafter be referred to as the Norris doctrine.
..Id. at 1375.
"4 Id. at 1373.
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that its own actions should not be applied regardless of the particular
facts of a given case.155 Clearly, the ASTA and Norris doctrines
represented diametrically opposed viewpoints on a state's duty to
dismantle segregated systems of higher education. 51 6 Seventeen years
after Brown I, a clear judicial doctrine defining a state's duty to
desegregate its university system had 5yet
to be developed, much less
7
be addressed, by the Supreme Court.
Many of these same issues were addressed two years later in
Honnicutt v. Burge, 5 ' in which the plaintiffs asked a district court to
compel the State of Georgia to take affirmative measures to
desegregate and improve the academic performance of Fort Valley
State College. 59
' The court found that the school remained essentially
an all-black institution despite a token presence of white students and
faculty. 6 ' Despite this finding, the Georgia Board of Regents argued
that they had acted in "good faith" to desegregate the college.' 6' The
court rejected the argument, stating that "[the] Board of Regents has
abdicated its legal responsibility to take affirmative action to
desegregate this state college by adopting a so called 'open-door
policy' and permitting the administration and faculty of the individual
colleges to implement this policy with no direction from above." 162
Honnicutt also specifically departed from Norris. When the
Norris court ordered remedial action to further integrate Virginia
State College, it stressed the importance attached to the school's

155 Id.

15 Compare ASTA, 289 F. Supp. at 787-89 (holding a state to a limited affirmative

duty to dismantle a segregated higher education system) with Norris, 327 F. Supp. at
1373 (holding that a state must take "the same steps . . . necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated 'root and branch"' at
the university level as would be required at the primary level).
157See Marcus, supra note 24, at 74.
"

356 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

id. at 1230. In reaching its conclusion, the court determined that the hiring of
I59
25 white faculty members, all assigned to inconsequential teaching or committee
positions, did not meet the constitutional duty to dismantle segregation in good faith.

Id.
'6oId. at 1238.
1 id. at 1230.
162 Id.
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independence and traditional identity.163 In Honnicutt, the court
approached the continuing role of the traditionally black school by
strictly interpreting the Supreme Court's analysis in Brown 1.164 The
court proclaimed that the "Supreme Court by holding in Brown I that
separate educational facilities are inherently unequal in reality held as
a matter of law that educational programs designed explicitly for the
black minority, and thus designed to attract just the black minority,
are inherently unequal. ,165 By simplistically and rigidly applying
Brown I's mandate without consideration of its underlying rationale,
the Honnicutt court completely ignored concerns over the ability of
traditionally black schools to continue providing unique and beneficial
educational opportunities to the black community without any finding
of stigmatizing harm resulting from the denial of equal educational
opportunity.' 66 Concern over the future of historically black schools
formed the basis of Justice Thomas' concurrence and Justice Scalia's
dissent in Fordice, and remains one of the most difficult questions
within the constitutional framework of school desegregation at the
167
college and university level.
In Geier v. Blanton, 6 ' the issue of merger as an acceptable
solution to segregation was again examined.' 69 The district court

'' 327 F. Supp. at 1372. The Norris court rejected the merger partly because of the
detrimental effects it would have to the traditionally black school which provided
educational opportunities to its black students not available at the historically white
schools. Id. at 1373.
'6 356 F. Supp. at 1238.
1" Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a report prepared by the

Carnegie Commission, which found that "America's colleges and universities founded
for Negroes historically have been the central institutions in an isolated system of
education developed explicitly to serve the black minority." Id. at 1231.
" See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 11, at 24-25 (1982) (discussing Federal Agencies
and Black Colleges, a report of the Federal Interagency Committee on Education,
revised January, 1971).
'67
See Fordice, 112 S.Ct. at 2744, 2746; see also infra part V.D-E.
' 427 F. Supp. 644 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
'6 Id. at 646. The court ordered Tennessee State University to merge with the
traditionally all-white University of Tennessee-Nashville Center after a prior order to
implement joint, cooperative, and exclusive programming failed to integrate either
school. Id. at 657. Students, faculty members of both universities, and the federal
government had requested the merger. Id. at 657-59. The Board of Trustees opposed
the plan. Id. at 656-57. Black college officials voiced concerns for the future of
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found that Tennessee had historically operated a dual system, that
Tennessee State University (TSU) had been established explicitly as
a black institution, 7 ' and that the proposed expansion of the
University of Tennessee (UT) would frustrate the efforts of TSU to
desegregate because the schools were within such close proximity to
one another. 7 ' The district court relied on a factual analysis of the
affects of the policies put in place and determined that TSU had not
been desegregated."i 2 Thus, under the Norris doctrine, further
affirmative steps were necessary.' 73 Accordingly, the court ordered
the two schools to merge, considering it to be the most feasible and
effective means to achieve integration. 74
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision,
after noting serious concerns over what it characterized as a "radical"
judicial remedy.' 75 The court's willingness to affirm was largely
dependent on the fact that it was the court, and consequently the
solution, of last resort.' 76

Considerable efforts to integrate the

faculty, improve TSU's campus, recruit white students to TSU, and
177
eliminate TSU's traditional role as an all-black school had failed.
The court of appeals viewed the merger as "the only reasonable
17
alternative" in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Green. 1

Tennessee State University and identified a lack of representation in administrative
positions and on governing boards as the systemic problem which needed to be
addressed. Id. at 657.
170 Id. at 652.
"I'Id. The State had argued that its affirmative duty had been discharged under the
ASTA doctrine. Id. At the appellate level, Judge Engel, in dissent, questioned whether
TSU's desire to retain its black identity was the real reason the school had not attracted
white students. Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1074-77 (6th Cir. 1979)
(Engel, J., dissenting).
172See Geier, 427 F. Supp. at 647, 652 (noting that 99.7% of the undergraduates
and 99.9% of the entering freshmen were black).
173 Geier, 427 F. Supp. at 652.
174 Id. at 657, 659.
'75Geier,
176 Id.

597 F.2d at 1068-69.

'77Id. at 1061.
17 Id. at 1065. Over the 10 year period following the merger, total enrollment at
TSU declined 36.8%, in contrast to a 6.9% decline in enrollment system-wide. L.
Tiffany Hawkins, Recognizing the Nightmare: The Merger of LouisianaState University
and Southern University Law Schools, 50 LA. L. REV. 557, 567 n.38 (1990).
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Relying on the Norris doctrine, the court of appeals rejected the
State's assertion that Green only applied to primary and secondary
schools, and held that the State's duty within the university context
is equally exacting.179
It is also important to note that the-Geier court's decision to
affirm the merger was prompted by the failure of the State's efforts
to integrate the schools.180 If the State's efforts had been successful,
its affirmative duty would have been satisfied.18 There is nothing
intrinsic in the decision that mandates universities, which have been
operated separately under a dual system, to merge when converting
to a unitary system.182 Instead, Geier established that a state has an
affirmative duty to remove all vestiges of prior discrimination in
traditionally black schools which retain racially identifiable
characteristics. 183
The next major case addressing the issue of merger reached
the exact opposite conclusion. In Artis v. Board of Regents of
Georgia,1"' the plaintiffs asked a district court to compel the State to
merge Savannah State College with Armstrong State College. 8 5 The
court denied the request because it found no evidence that the
independent status of the two schools impeded efforts to desegregate
either school.186 The plaintiffs next asked the court to compel the
State to end the duplication of programs in the schools in order to
help foster desegregation. 8 7 The court once again refused to grant
the plaintiffs' request.188 Instead, the court held that the schools'
current racial composition was a product of free choice and not the

'7 Geier, 597 F.2d at 1065. Extending Green to higher education is an important
development, and a precursor to the Supreme Court's analysis in Fordice. See infra text
accompanying notes 191-208.
"So See Geier, 597 F.2d at 1065; Baxter, supra note 11, at 14.
1' Geier, 597 F.2d at 1065. See generally Baxter, supra note 11, at 14-15 (stating

that the district court endorsed the State's efforts as sufficient action to eliminate the role
of TSU as a traditionally black institution).
112Geier, 597 F.2d at 1070.
183Baxter, supra note 11, at 16.
18 Civ. No. CV479-251 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
18IId. at *1.
186Id.
187 Id.

188Id.
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result of an unconstitutional policy of segregation."8 9 The court in
Artis, thus, ruled that freedom of choice plans satisfy a state's duty
to dismantle dual school systems, and implicitly rejected Geier's
extension of Green to the context of higher education.19 The basic
contradiction inherent in the competing standards, and the open
question as to applying Greene to desegregate colleges and
universities, presented fundamental issues to be decided by the
Supreme Court in Fordice.
V. United States v. Fordice
A. Fordice in the Lower Courts
All of the parties involved in Fordice19' agreed that a state's
affirmative duty to dismantle segregated school systems at the
primary and secondary levels extends to the context of higher
education. 192 However, they disagreed over whether Mississippi had
complied with this duty.193 Thus, the fundamental issue to be
resolved was the standard to be applied to measure a state's
compliance under the law and whether Mississippi had met the
standard.'94
The District Court for the Northern of Mississippi, relying on
Bazemore v. Friday, 95 disagreed with the plaintiffs' assertion that the
Supreme Court's rejection of freedom of choice plans to desegregate
primary and secondary schools in Green extends to the context of
higher education. 96 The court then applied the ASTA doctrine, and
concluded that "the affirmative duty to desegregate does not
contemplate either restricting choice or achievement of any degree of

Artis, Civ. No. CV479-251 at *1.
"0 Id. at *5.

"I'See supra part I. (discussing the factual background to the dispute).
191112 S. Ct. at 2734.
193Id. at 2735.
9 Id. at 2732.
191478 U.S. 312 (1986). For a discussion of Bazemore, see infra text accompanying
notes 206-07.
"9Ayers v. A~lain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1554 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
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racial balance."197 The court noted the importance of patterns of
enrollment and faculty hiring, but placed a greater emphasis on the
examination of current education policy, and its role in determining
If race-neutral
the racial identifiability of the institution.19
educational policies were developed and implemented in good faith,
then the State had met its burden.1 99 After applying this standard to
determine whether Mississippi's efforts had met this test, the court
concluded that: "[C]urrent actions on the part of the defendants
demonstrate conclusively that the defendants are fulfilling their
affirmative duty to disestablish the former de jure segregated system
of higher education." 200
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.20 1
"Mississippi was

. . .

constitutionally required to eliminate invidious

racial distinctions and dismantle its dual system. , 202 The court of
appeals held that Mississippi had met these requirements by adopting
race-neutral policies and providing all students with the "freedom of
choice" to attend the college or university they wish. 2 3 Any
remaining racial identities among the institutions were the result of
free choice, and not the remnants of past invidious racial
discrimination.20 4
The plaintiffs filed writs of certiorari with the Supreme
2
Court. 5 Thirty-eight years after Brown I, the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to end the confusion in the lower courts by
enunciating a clear standard of a state's duty to dismantle a formerly
segregated system of higher education.20 6 At the heart of the appeal
was the basic contradiction between the standards announced in
Norris and Geier, which applied the Court's decision in Green to
higher education, and the doctrines enunciated in Artis and ASTA,

-

Id. at 1553.
at 1554.

'98 Id.

199 Id.

m Id. at 1564.
201Ayers v. A~lain, 914 F.2d 676, 692 (5th Cir. 1990).
202

Id. at 682.

Id. at 678.
' See id. at 692.
25 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2735.
6 Id.

2
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7
which rejected the applicability of Green to higher education.1
Thus, the central question before the Court in Fordice was whether
the mere adoption of race-neutral admission policies discharged a
state's duty to dismantle a formerly segregated university system or
whether states must take additional affirmative steps to desegregate
racially identifiable institutions
where race-neutral admission policies
20
so.
do
to
failed
have
alone

B. The Standard Announced-Justice White's Majority Opinion
In an opinion delivered by Justice White,20 9 the Court vacated
the court of appeals.210 Justice White clearly stated that by adopting
Bazemore and rejecting Green, the court of appeals had applied the
wrong legal standard. 211 The issue, according to Justice White, was
whether the racial identifiability of a school is attributable to a state
policy, regardless of whether race-neutral admission policies have
been adopted:
Our decisions establish that a State does not discharge
its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies
and practices traceable to its prior dejure dual system
that continue to foster segregation. Thus we have
consistently asked whether existing racial
identifiability is attributable to the State and examined
a wide range of factors to determine whether the State
has perpetuated its formerly de jure segregation in
any facet of its institutional system.21 2
Thus, the Court's analysis focused on Mississippi's efforts to
eradicate vestiges of its de jure system.
supra text accompanying notes 147-57, 168-83.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-41, 184-90.
209 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2732. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, id. at
207 See
208

2743, as did Justice Thomas, id. at 2744, while Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment
in part and dissented in part, id. at 2746.
210Id. at 2743.
2Id. at 2737-38.
212Id. at 2735 (citations omitted).
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In Fordice, the State argued that Green2 1 3 should be rejected
because of the voluntary nature. of higher education.2" 4 At the
primary and secondary level, education is compulsory and the courses
are for the most part uniform. 215' However, higher education is not
compulsory, and each institution offers the student unique educational
dei
to seek higher education and the
opportunities. 216 The decision
selection of an institution is always one of free choice.217 Thus, once
race-neutral policies are in place, the racial composition of
universities are the complete product of free choice, and do not
correspond to current or past discrimination. 218' As summarized by
the court of appeals:
If an aspiring student may freely choose to attend
college, if he may freely choose among all institutions
in the state, and if no authority exists to deny him the
right to attend the institution of his choice, he is done
a severe disservice by remedies which in seeking to
maximize integration, minimize diversity and vitiate
his choices. 219

213In Green, New Kent County adopted a freedom of choice plan to dismantle its

dual school system. 391 U.S. at 433. Students could choose to go to either the
formerly all white school or the formerly all black school. Id. at 433-34. Only 15%
of the black children chose to attend the white school. Id. at 441. No white children
chose to attend the black school. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the freedom of choice
plan because it proved ineffective in dismantling the racial identity of the schools. Id.
While the intentional discrimination had been eliminated, vestiges of the de jure system
remained. Id. The past effects of intentional discrimination constrained choices so that
they were not really free. As such, freedom of choice had not dismantled segregation
as much as it merely dressed it in new clothes. Id.
214 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736. A state has different interests in higher education
than it does in education at the primary and secondary levels. Hawkins, supra note 178,
at 560. Admission standards must be set to ensure that those admitted will most likely
succeed. Id. In addition, there is a limited amount of space and not everybody can be
admitted. Id. Consequently, states must be given broad discretion to formulate
admission policies. Id.
215 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736.
216 Id.
217

Id.

218

Id.

219 Ayers,

914 F.2d at 687.
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While Justice White agreed that higher education is
fundamentally different from primary and secondary education
because of its voluntary nature, he disagreed that the adoption of
race-neutral admissions policies alone relieve the State of its
affirmative duty to dismantle formerly segregated university
systems. 220 "In a system based on choice, student attendance is
determined not simply by admissions policies, but also by many other
factors. Although some of these factors clearly cannot be attributed
to state policies, many can be."12' Implicitly, Justice White had
extended Green to higher education.222
Justice White next rejected the lower court's adoption of the
ASTA doctrine by distinguishing the facts in Fordice from those in
Bazemore.223 In Bazemore, the Court addressed whether financial
and administrative assistance provided to 4H clubs was permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause because of the racial identifiability
resulting from the voluntary choices of the club members. 2 4 The
Bazemore Court held Green inapplicable to the 4H clubs because it
determined "any racial imbalance [in the 4H chapters] resulted from
the wholly voluntary and unfettered choice of private individuals. "225
The lower courts, relying on Bazemore, held Green inapplicable in
Fordice on similar grounds, and, thus, were able to invoke ASTA to
declare that the affirmative steps taken by Mississippi to adopt race
neutral admissions policies constituted constitutional compliance. 2 6
Justice White expressly rejected this reasoning, and stated that the

2o

Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736, 2743.

2' Id. at 2736. Justice White's opinion instructed the lower court to determine
whether the universities' admission standards, program duplication, institutional mission
designations, and geographic proximity affect student choice thereby perpetuating
segregation, and whether such policies are educationally justifiable. Id. at 2742-43; see
Marcus, supra note 16, at Al.
222See Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2748-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). "[Tihe court is essentially applying to universities the
amorphous standard adopted for primary and secondary schools in Green." Id. at 2748.
2 Id. at 2737.
n 478 U.S. at 493
2 Id.
226Ayers, 914 F.2d at 686-87; Ayers v. Allain, 674 F.Supp. 1523, 1552-53 (N.D.

Miss. 1987).

1994]

COLLEGE DESEGREGATION

373

Court only approved the voluntary choice program in Bazemore:
[A]fter satisfying ourselves that the State had not
fostered segregation by playing a part in the decision
of which club an individual chose to join. Bazemore
plainly does not excuse inquiry into whether
Mississippi has left in place certain aspects of its prior
dual system that perpetuate the racially segregated
higher education system.227
Thirty-eight years after the Court's decision in Brown I,
Justice White finally announced a coherent judicial framework
applicable to a state's affirmative duty to dismantle formerly
segregated university and college systems:
If the state perpetuates policies and practices traceable
to its prior system that continue to have segregative
effects-whether by influencing student enrollment
decisions or by fostering segregation in other facets of
the university system-and such policies are without
sound educational justification and can be practicably
eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of
proving that it has dismantled its prior system. Such
policies run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause,
even though the State has abolished the legal
requirement that whites and blacks be educated
separately and has established racially neutral policies
not animated by a discriminatory purpose.228
The case was remanded to the District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi to determine whether Mississippi has met these
requirements.229 Justice White did not spell out the specific remedial
measures which would have to be taken should Mississippi fail to

227 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
22 Id.

n9 Id. at 2743.
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meet the new standard.23 ° Justice White did, however, point to the
following four specific policies the State would have to justify or
eliminate: (1) The disparity in minimum composite ACT scores which
remain higher for the traditionally white schools; 23' (2) the "mission
designations" under which no black school has been assigned as a
"comprehensive" university;2 32 (3) the unnecessary duplication of
programs at black and white universities which inhibit
desegregation;2 33 and (4) the continued operation of all eight
universities.234

C. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that
the state maintains the burden of proof when policies traceable to
prior segregation are questioned, and that "[w]here the State can
accomplish legitimate educational objectives through less segregative
means, the courts may infer lack of good faith.

"235

D. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion stressed two points.

6

230 Justice White conclusively held that if "the State has not met its affirmativK

obligation to dismantle its prior dual system,, it shall be adjudged in violation of the
Constitution and Title VII and remedial proceedings shall be conducted." Id.
2' Id. at 2738-39.
232Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2741-42.
23 Id. at 2740-41.
- Id. at 2742-43. It is important to note that Justice White made it clear that this
list was not exhaustive, and that all aspects of Mississippi's university system are open
to examination. Id. at 2738.
35 Id. at 2744 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under Brown and subsequent decisions,
school boards bear the burden of proving that the existence of racially identifiable
schools is not the result of discrimination when policies are questioned. Jarvis, supra
note 28, at 1295. The purpose of Justice O'Connor's opinion was to stress that in the
context of higher education, this burden remains on the state. 1d.
236 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2744 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas was
participating in his first school desegregation case after removing himself from the other
two segregation cases decided during the 1991-92 term. Review of Opinions on
Individual Rights From the 1991-92 Term, U.S. L.J., Aug. 7, 1992, at 65. Justice
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First, Justice Thomas addressed concerns that the decision might
jeopardize the continued existence of historically black schools by
stating that the decision does "not foreclose the possibility that there
exists 'sound educational justification' for maintaining historically
black colleges . . . open to all on a race-neutral basis, but with

established traditions and programs that might disproportionately
237
appeal to one race or another.
Second, Justice Thomas noted that this decision deviated
from Green in that Green presumed that present discriminatory intent
in the post de jure era must be proven. 38 Under Justice White's new
standard, one must only show that a policy, intact from the de jure
era, produces current adverse impacts without sound educational
justification.239 This marks a significant expansion of the district
court's remedial power.24
E. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia alone dissented with grave warnings concerning
the unintended consequences of the decision.24 ' Justice Scalia did not
share Justice Thomas's optimism and unhappily predicted that the
holding would result in "the elimination of predominantly black
institutions."24 2 Justice Scalia thought that the Court's reliance on
Green in the context of higher education was misplaced, and
constituted an "all or nothing" approach in which the Court
completely eliminated the opportunity for blacks, as a consequence
of private choice, to attend schools serving their community. 243
Thomas appropriately began his opinion by quoting W.E.B. Du Bois: "We must rally
to the defense of our schools. We must repudiate this unbearable assumption of the right
to kill institutions unless they conform to one narrow standard." Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at
2744 (Thomas, J., concurring).
237 Fordice, 112 S.Ct. at 2746 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2m See id. at 2744 (Thomas, J.,concurring).
" Id. at 2745 (Thomas, J.,concurring).
240 Id.
2l See Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2751 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
242Id. at 2752 (Scalia, J.,concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
243

Id.
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Justice Scalia predicted "years of litigation-driven confusion
and destabilization in the university systems of all the formerly de
jure states, that will benefit neither blacks nor whites." 2' While
recognizing the importance of reaffirming the Court's hatred of
segregation, Justice Scalia insisted that the Court "must find some
other way of making the point. "245

VI. The Reaction, the Aftermath, and the Future of Publicly
Funded Black Institutions of Higher Learning
Most commentators praised the decision, seeing it as a major
reaffirmation of the principles first announced in Brown I, and a
significant victory in the fight for equal educational opportunity at the
university level." 6 However, the Court refused to order more
funding to strengthen the traditionally black schools as asked for by
the plaintiffs, 7 and even hinted that these schools continued existence
244Id. at 2753 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
245

Id.

246 The NAACP released a statement praising the decision:

Today's decision sends a clear message to state supported colleges
and universities that they must do much more than pay lip service to
desegregation. They have to act aggressively to erase the remaining
residue of segregation. .

.

. We, of course, will of course continue

to advocate the continuance of all these institutions with adequate
funding and diversity of student body, faculty and staff, and meeting
all requirements of Brown v. Board of Education.
Statement by NAACP on Supreme Court Ruling in U.S. v. Fordice, PR Newswire, June
26, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Current File (quoting Dr. Benjamin
Hooks, executive director). The decision was a "'very strong reaffirmation of the
principles of Brown v. (Board of Education). It applies them to higher education in the
South . . . and I think in the end it's a very, very good development for improving
higher education opportunities for blacks in the South."' Marcus, supra note 16, at Al
(quoting David Tatel, a former civil rights official in the Carter administration who had
filed a brief in the case). Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, who had participated in the
suit on the side of the plaintiffs called the ruling "a magnificent victory for the United
States." Id.
247 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743. The lawyer for the plaintiffs stated that:
"We won the case but the court didn't do what we wanted. We
wanted them to declare liability and then remand for remedy . ...
We haven't even had a trial on liability [for differential funding,
college attendance rates and governance]. The way the court sent
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may not be economically viable.248 Some commentators viewed this
as a failure by the Court to appreciate the importance of the black
institutions,2 49 and voiced concern over their future."'

the case back down, with an order for the state to come up with a
plan, this thing has taken on a life of its own."
Raspberry, supra note 59, at A23 (quoting Alvin Chambliss).
248 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743.
249There are 47 historically black state-run colleges, most of which are in the South.
Julie J. Oxford, Are Black Colleges Worth Saving?, TIME, Nov. 11, 1991, at 81.
Despite being underfunded and ignored they remain an invaluable resource to the black
community. Id. While the number of blacks attending college has steadily decreased
over the last decade, the enrollment of these black schools has increased 13.2% from
1986 to 1989. Id. Black colleges have educated civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther
King, Thurgood Marshall, former Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder, and Pulitzer Prize
winning author Toni Morrison among others. Eric Harrison, Black Colleges Fear
Litigation Means Loss of Control, Identity, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 4, 1992, at
4A. Without these schools, the needs of black students would probably be left unmet at
the predominately white schools. Id. W.E.B. Du Bois observed that:
Starting with the present conditions and using the facts and
knowledge of the present situation of American Negroes, the Negro
[college] expands toward the possession and the conquest of all
knowledge ....
[Without it] the American Negro . . . is doomed
to be a suppressed and inferior caste in the United States for
incalculable time.
W.E.B. Du Bois, The Field and Function of a Negro College, Speech Delivered at the
Annual Alumni Reunion at Fisk University (June 1933), in Du Bois, The Negro College,
40 THE CRISIS 175, 176 (Aug. 1933).
"Black colleges . . . play an important role in preserving and proselytzing
cultural heritage, history, and traditions . . . . [BIlack colleges can play [an
indispensable role] in alleviating the impact of this country's long and continued history
of racial oppression." Bell, supra note 113, at 981.
2 Frank Mathews, publisher of Black Issues In Higher Education, commented that:
[B]lack colleges are fixing to go the same way that secondary schools
did as a result of Brown. Given the history of race relations in the
South, I think what will happen is that the black colleges will
eventually be merged out of existence or will be closed in the name
of integration.
Lynn Duke, Integration Agreements Could be Reexamined; Fate of Historically Black
Colleges Muddied, WASH. POST, June 27, 1992, at All. Janell Byrd of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund echoed these feelings:
The concerns about the risks for the historically black colleges are
very real. It would have been helpful to have language that, as they
desegregate, states ought to be careful not to disproportionately
burden the (black) plaintiffs in devising remedies . . . . That's
always been the threat in these cases: 'You ask for more, we'll wipe
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Those critical of the decision fear that, as states are ordered
to desegregate their systems of higher education, plans to provide
more money to traditionally black schools to improve educational
opportunities, in accordance with the principles first announced in
Brown I, may take a backseat to plans merely seeking desegregation
through racial balancing in accordance with Brown II's integrative
model. 51 In this way, the cure for segregation is not found in the
elimination of discrimination against blacks, but on the reliance of a
misguided integrative model, which will destroy black institutions by
requiring that they merge with white institutions, unless they can
attract a sufficient number of white students and faculty.25
The integrative model, thus, puts black colleges in a "no win"
situation. By definition, an integrated school is predominately
white. 53 A school that is mainly black is considered racially
identifiable, 254 and must be integrated without any thought as to
whether equal educational opportunities are denied because of the
racial makeup of the school or because of the lack of adequate
funding due to discriminatory policies.255 To receive additional
funding, a traditionally black school must either be absorbed into a
white school, which will inevitably destroy the unique advantages it
affords black students, or attract a sufficient number of white students
which is unlikely as long as it is considered inferior due to
underfunding.256 If the traditional black college cannot attract a
sufficient white presence, it will most likely be closed or merged with
a white school.257 By emphasizing racial balancing, rather than the
expansion of educational opportunities on the black campus,

out the historically black colleges.
Marcus, supra note 16, at Al. These concerns are not unfounded; the burdens of
desegregation in education usually fall disproportionately on blacks. See Days, supra
note 7, at 55. Desegregation resulted in black teachers and administrators losing their
jobs, and black students were more likely than white students to be bussed outside their
own neighborhoods. Id.
" Bell, supra note 113, at 966.
252 Id. at 966-67.
2" Id. at 951.
2 id.
2" Id. at 955.
I Bell, supra note 113, at 955.
27 See Days, supra note 7, at 65.
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traditionally black schools, which have historically sustained the black
community, are inevitably destroyed.25 Based on this model of equal
opportunity, one is left wondering whether the remedy provided by
Brown H's integrative model is truly better than the disease it was
intended to cure.
On October 22, 1992, Mississippi submitted its desegregation
plan to the Federal District Court in Oxford, Mississippi.259 The
proposal confirmed critics' worst fears.26 Rather than increasing the
funding received by traditionally black institutions to upgrade their
programs and increase their standing, the plan, predictably relying on
the integrative model, called for racial balancing through mergers and
closings.261 Black leaders quickly condemned the plan: "'They seem
to define desegregation as the systematic movement of all things
black to all things white when we prefer to see it as the emphatic
movement of all things wrong to all things right. "'262 The plans
complete failure to address the racial makeup of the Board of
Trustees, the racial imbalance of administration and faculty
throughout the system, and the fate of the State's junior college
system was of particular concern to the plaintiffs' attorneys.2 63 The
plan does provide for a new admission policy which includes
consideration of high school student's academic performance rather
than relying solely on ACT scores.2 6 Judge Neal B. Biggers, Jr. has
yet to make a final determination regarding the plan.265
Bell, supra note 113, at 961.
'5"Ronald Smothers, Plan to Desegregate Universities in Mississippi is Met With
Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1992, at Al.
260See id.
261 Id. Alcorn State would become a satellite campus of Mississippi State. Id. Delta
State and Mississippi Valley State would merge under the new name Delta Valley
Mississippi State and be controlled by the University of Mississippi. Id. Mississippi
University for Women would merge with the University of Southern Mississippi by
becoming a branch campus. Id. at A23.
262 Id. (quoting Rev. Joseph Lowery, president of the Southern Christain Leadership
Conference).
263See id.
264 Smothers, supra note 259, at A23. Any student in college preparatory programs
with a 3.2 grade point average or above would be admitted to any state school, as would
any student in preparatory programs earning either a 2.5 or better and an ACT score of
at least 16, or students with a 2.0 or better and an ACT above 18. Id.
20 Id. at Al.
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling in Fordice undoubtedly ushers in
a new day and will extend opportunities to blacks in the context of
higher education that are long over due. Discriminatory educational
policies that deny equal access to institutions of higher learning can
no longer be justified or excused by the rallying cry of "freedom of
choice."
Although Fordice stands as a major reaffirmation of the
principles first announced in Brown v. Board of Education, it leaves
many troubling questions unanswered. Justice Scalia's warnings and
dire predictions are well-founded and heed serious attention, but need
not become self-fulfilling prophecies. The fate of traditionally black
public colleges and universities hangs in the balance.
If one were to take a step back, however, and concentrate on
Brown's substantive constitutional principle of equality of educational
opportunities rather than on Brown 11's remedial integrative ideal, one
can see that the Constitution does not require the traditional black
school to provide an integrated setting but merely that it provide
equal educational opportunities to all whom may wish to attend.
The constitutional evil addressed in Brown I was the
degradation segregation imposed on black children. Implicit in the
decision, was the dismantling of state-imposed dual systems which
bestowed a sense of inferiority on the black children, who in essence
were being told they were not worthy of attending school with white
children. Where black college students have a real opportunity to
attend any state school they wish and freely choose to attend a
traditionally black school, however, no such badge of inferiority is
bestowed on them. To the contrary, black colleges have served as a
tremendous resource to the black community. The traditional black
college is perhaps the only place young black students can study the
contributions of their culture to American society without the
experiences being marginalized or devalued. To destroy what instills
a sense of pride and self-esteem in blacks by blindly following an
integrative ideal, which means well, but is misplaced, stands as a
negation of the principles expressed in Brown I, rather than their
affirmation. Thus, by concentrating on Brown I's substantive
constitutional principle of equality of educational opportunities, rather
than on Brown I1's remedial integrative ideal, one can see that the
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Constitution does not require the traditional black school to provide
an integrated setting but merely that it provide equal educational
opportunities to all whom may wish to attend.
Forty years after its decision in Brown I, the Supreme Court
need no longer look at what makes blacks second class citizens, but
what prevents blacks from becoming full participants in Amercian
society. A new judicial framework concentrating on equality of
educational opportunity, rather than racial balancing, is needed to
achieve that goal.

S. David Friedman

